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Item 5
Joint Statement of Benjamin Busch, Walter E. Craig, Donald K.
Duvall,* Harry A. Inman,* Robert Layton, Leonard C. Meeker,
Charles R. Norberg, and John R. Stevenson
On July 22, 1963, President Kennedy sent to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification three Human Rights treaties: the
Supplementary Slavery Convention, the Convention Concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labor, and the Convention on the Political Rights
of Women. Briefly stated, these Conventions would embody the following obligations: under the Supplementary Slavery Convention, the
parties undertake to abolish debt bondage, serfdom, the transfer of a
woman in marriage without her consent, and the delivery of a child
(by parent or guardian) to another person for exploitation of the
child's labor. Under the Forced Labor Convention, the parties undertake to outlaw forced labor as a means of political coercion or as
punishment for political views, as a means of mobilizing labor for
economic development, as a means of labor discipline, as a punishment for having participated in strikes (the negotiating history shows
that this provision was not designed to ban forced labor as a punishment for participation in an illegal strike),' or as a means of racial,
* See separate additional statement by Duvall (supra, pp. 646-648) and Inman.

(supra, p. 648).
1 The language of the Convention prohibiting forced labor as a punishment
for participation in strikes was adopted in the wake of a substantial discussion
as to its scope. In the 1956 Conference Committee on the Convention, the
Soviet Government proposed a broadly worded amendment that would have
barred "forced labor as a consequence of judicial or administrative measures
which limit, prohibit or punish participation in strikes." This amendment was
later withdrawn in favor of the formulation that was eventually incorporated
in Article 1(d). During the discussion of this part of the Convention, the
Government representatives from India and Japan proposed the deletion of
Article 1(d). Subsequently, they dropped this proposal, following clarifications
by other representatives. The Workers' members who were supporting the
language that became Article 1(d) expressed the view that under this provision
strikes could nevertheless be declared illegal in certain circumstances. In this
connection it was pointed out that the penalty for taking part in an illegal strike
might be imprisonment, which might involve hard labor. The Workers' members of the Committee indicated that they were not concerned with this position,
which they regarded as being outside the scope of the Convention. I.L.O.,
Forced Labor, Proceedings of the 39th Session (1956) of the International
Labor Conference, Report IV(l) for the Agenda of the 40th Session (1957),
at p. 8 (Geneva, 1956). By the time of the 1957 Conference, at which the
final text of the Forced Labor Convention was adopted, a representative of
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social, national, or religious discrimination. The Convention on the
Political Rights of Women provides for equal suffrage and equal
eligibility for election to publicly elected bodies, to hold public office,
and to exercise public functions established by national law. Objections of both a legal and policy nature have been raised
against these three treaties. It has been stated that they are "concerned with matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States," that they govern relations between a state and its own
citizens, and that they are therefore not proper subjects for exercise
of the treaty power. In the view of the undersigned, the contention
that the three treaties would be unconstitutional is invalid, and the
assertion that they ought not as a matter of policy to be ratified is
unsound.
Constitutional Considerations
The treaty power is grounded on Article II, section 2, clause
two of the Constitution, which states that the President "shall have
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." ' Although the Supreme Court has never held a treaty unconstitutional,
the Court has consistently indicated that there are constitutional limits
India's Employers noted the interpretation that had been given to Article 1(d)
by the Workers' members. He said:
"In view of this clarification we feel that we may also join all other
progressive forces in supporting this historic convention, as set out in
the draft placed before you, and we hope and pray that it will serve as
a beacon light in the onward march on the path of human progress.
Hence our vote in favor of the report." Record of Proceedings, International Labor Conference, 40th Session (1957), at p. 345.
The view that Article 1(d) has a narrow scope, not covering penalties for
illegal strikes, was confirmed in the Report of the I.L.O. Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. International Labor
Conference, 46th Session, 1962, Report on Forced Labor, pp. 226-230.
2 In the course of the United Nations General Assembly's consideration of
this Convention, the U.S. Delegation recorded its understanding that the term
"public office" is not intended to include military service. 28 State Dep't Bull.
30 (1953).
3 Article VI provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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on the treaty power. Long ago the Court expressed views that may be
taken as still authoritative today:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms
unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that
instrument against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government
itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that
it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,
or a change in the character of the government, or in that of
one of the States, or cession of any portion of the territory of
the latter, without its consent. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
267 (1890).
The same view was repeated in Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341
(1924), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957). In Asakura
the Court stated that the treaty power "does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations."
A few years later, Charles Evans Hughes, before he became
Chief Justice, said:
The nation has the power to make any agreement whatever
in a constitutional manner that relates to the conduct of our
international relations, unless there can be found some express
prohibition in the Constitution....

He said further that attempts to use the treaty power "to deal with
matters which did not pertain to our external relations but to control
matters which normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of the States" might well be unconstitutional because the
power "is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating
to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United
States in their internal concerns through the exercise of the asserted
treaty-making power."
There is, of course, the possibility that the Supreme Court would
decide that what was properly a matter of international concern was
a political question that could only be determined by the President
and the Senate in the discharge of their constitutional responsibilities.
Let us assume, however, for present purposes that the treaty power
is limited to "all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations." It is worth noting at the outset that this
test is entirely different from one questioning whether the subject of
a treaty lies within domestic jurisdiction. Under the latter type of
test, if the answer were affirmative, the treaty would be unconstitutional even though it might deal with a matter that is acknowledged to
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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be of international concern as well as to lie within domestic jurisdiction. Such a test would, in effect, place an absolute bar on development of the role of international law in world affairs. The fact that a
subject came to be recognized as increasingly a matter of international
concern would not, under this test, enable the United States to join
with other countries in dealing with the subject by treaty. In an ever
more interdependent world whose need for extending the jurisdiction
of international law is manifest, the United States could not safely
subject its well-being and indeed the prospects of survival to the fetters
of such an essentially retrogressive rule.
The test indicated by Mr. Hughes and in some of the Supreme
Court cases is quite distinct. It asks whether a matter dealt with in a
treaty is a proper subject of international negotiation. If the answer is
affirmative, then the treaty is constitutional even though the subject
of the treaty is also a matter of domestic concern.
Still another test has been put forward by opponents of the three
Human Rights Conventions. Their test is whether the treaty is "concerned with matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States." Under this test, it is not required that a subject be
exclusively within domestic jurisdiction in order that the treaty should
be unconstitutional. Instead, the subject matter must be only essentially within domestic jurisdiction. The adverb employed in this
test begs the question. This is true not only as a matter of the language
used in the test but is evident from the very source of the test formula.
This formulation has its origin in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United
Nations Charter, which provides, in part:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
Quite apart from the evident difficulty of trying to apply to the
scope of the treaty power under the United States Constitution a test
based on Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, it
seems clear enough that no such test has been accepted in our constitutional law or even intimated in any of the Supreme Court opinions. The most that the Court and other leading authorities can be
found to have said in this area is that the treaty power extends to "all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other
nations." That test, which we are now considering, refers of necessity
to the concept and scope of treaties as established in international law
and practice.
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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International law places no limitations on the subject matter of
treaties. International practice obviously changes and develops with
the passage of time and the unfolding of history. In commenting on
this, the American Bar Association Special Committee on International Unification of Private Law said in 1961 that "practice moves us
no closer to a definitive decision unless one is prepared, as this Committee is not, to freeze such matters at some arbitrary date of Constitutional development." In other words, the scope of the treaty power
under the Constitution is linked to current realities of international
relations among the members of the world community.
The limitation that a treaty must deal with a subject that is
proper for negotation with other nations undoubtedly means that the
United States Government cannot use the making of a treaty with
another government as a mere device for changing domestic law in
the United States. It is hard to believe that any treaty so contrived
would be signed, much less ratified. It is particularly unlikely that a
multilateral treaty would ever be designed as a contrivance for circumventing constitutional limitations on the treaty power.
International minimum standards on the treatment of human
beings, especially by their governments, have long been a matter of
international concern and have been considered by the United States
to be a subject of foreign relations. President Roosevelt pointed out
in his Four Freedoms speech in 1941 that there was a direct relationship between human rights and a secure and peaceful world. This
thought was later expressed, against the background of experience of
the Second World War, by General George Marshall when he was
Secretary of State:
Governments which systematically disregard the rights of their
own people are not likely to respect the rights of other nations
and other people, and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the international field.
The United Nations Charter, drafted in 1945 and approved by
a vote of 89 to 2 in the Senate, embodies human rights obligations in
Article 55, where it is stated that the United Nations shall promoteuniversal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.
Article 56 goes on to say:
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement
of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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At the conclusion of the San Francisco conference, President Truman
said that the Charter was "dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can
attain those objectives for all men and women everywhere . . . we
cannot have permanent peace and security."
International concern for human rights is no less real or valid
today than it was at the end of World War II. Governments around
the world are concerned to set minimum standards by international
agreement.
The Conventions on Slavery, Forced Labor, and Political Rights
of Women are all bona fide treaties. They have as their purpose the
setting of minimum standards for the treatment of human beings.
These Conventions are not devices contrived by the President of the
United States to destroy our constitutional system of legislation and
make new laws in this country through exercise of the treaty power.
The Conventions undertake to cope with areas in international relations that have been of concern to many governments, including our
own, over a substantial period of time.'
Before leaving the question of constitutional validity of these
three Conventions, the argument that they govern relations between
a state and its own citizens, and therefore exceed the treaty power,
should be considered. No such limitation is mentioned or hinted at
in the Supreme Court cases dealing with the treaty power. Moreover,
the practice of the United States in making treaties negatives any
such proposition. During the last fifty years this country has become
a party to a number of treaties bearing on relations between a government and its own citizens. One of these is the 1926 Slavery Convention, adhered to by the United States in 1929. This is a predecessor of
the Supplementary Slavery Convention now before the Senate. Under
the 1926 Convention, parties to the treaty undertake to outlaw both
the slave trade and slavery within their respective territories. Another
example is the series of narcotic drug conventions to which the United
States has become a party. These regulate in detail the internal production, sale, and distribution of narcotic drugs.
4 Today more than 120 Member States of the United Nations engage in
negotiation of treaties in the field of international standards for individual
rights. Sixty-nine States have ratified the Slavery Convention; 77 the Convention on the Forced Labor; and 53 the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women.
International Lawyer, Vol.
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Advisability of the Three Conventions
Because great attention has been devoted to constitutional law
considerations by opponents of the three Human Rights Conventions,
the undersigned have thought it proper to set out in some detail their
views on the scope of the treaty power, particularly in relation to
these three treaties. Before concluding a statement of their views,
the authors wish to comment briefly on the merits of the three Conventions. Here we would start with a frank recognition that treaties
are not a panacea by which human rights can be guaranteed the world
over. Practical experience makes us keenly aware of the difficulties
and shortcomings. It is evident that the world still has a long way
to go in improving the treatment of human beings. Many answers
must be sought. There is no one easy answer.
Each treaty must, of course, be looked at individually and considered on its individual merits. Some of us, for example, are of the
view that the policy arguments on the merits in support of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women are less convincing than
those favoring ratification of the Slavery and Forced Labor Conventions. Not all human rights treaties are necessarily desirable and
assured of producing favorable results. The fact that the United
States Senate advises and consents to the ratification of three Human
Rights Conventions now before it in nowise commits the Senate to
like action on other treaties.
Some brief observations with respect to the three Conventions
seem appropriate. First, the substance of all of them has long been
embodied in law in force in the United States.' The essence of the
Slavery and Forced Labor Conventions was written into our law by
constitutional amendment after the Civil War. The Supplementary
Convention on Slavery obligates the parties to "take all practicable
and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment
of the following institutions and practices, where they still exist and
whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained
in article I of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926": (a) debt bondage; (b) serfdom; (c) the transfer of a
woman in marriage without her consent by her parents, guardian,
family, husband, or his family or clan, or by inheritance; and (d) the
Report, dated January 20, 1966, of Committee on International Law of
New York State Bar Association.
International La .er,
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delivery of a child under 18 years of age by a parent or guardian or
another person for exploitation of the child's labor.
Under the Forced Labor Convention, the parties undertake
to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or
compulsory labour(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a
punishment for holding or expressing political views or views
ideologically opposed to the established political, social or
economic system;
(b) as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development;
(c) as a means of labour discipline;
(d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes;
(e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious
discrimination.
In view of the limits indicated by the negotiating history of this Convention with respect to the scope of (d), it seems clear that the stipulations of the Forced Labor Convention as well as of the Supplementary Convention on Slavery are already law in the United States.
The Convention on the Political Rights of Women has three
brief articles. Under the first, women are guaranteed the right "to
vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination." Article II provides:
Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected
bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men,
without any discrimination.
And Article III provides:
Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise
all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms
with men, without any discrimination.
These obligations have long been given effect in the United States
through the 19th Amendment to the Constitution and other laws
guaranteeing equal rights.
In order to confirm what the negotiating history shows, we recommend that the Senate in its resolution of advice and consent to
the Forced Labor Convention include a statement that its approval of
ratification is given on the basis of its understanding that the Convention is not applicable to prison labor imposed after conviction for
participating in an illegal strike or imposed for violation of an injunction against a strike, and in its resolution relating to the ConvenInternational Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
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tion on Political Rights of Women express its understanding that in
Article III the phrase "public office" does not include military service
and the phrase "public function" is coterminous with "public office."
In sending the three Human Rights Conventions to the Senate
President Kennedy made the following submissions:
United States law is, of course, already in conformity with
these conventions, and ratification would not require any change
in our domestic legislation. However, the fact that our Constitution already assures us of these rights does not entitle us to
stand aloof from documents which project our own heritage on
an international scale. The day-to-day unfolding of events
makes it ever clearer that our own welfare is interrelated with
the rights and freedoms assured the peoples of other nations.
These conventions deal with human rights which may not
yet be secure in other countries; they have provided models for
the drafters of constitutions and laws in newly independent
nations; and they have influenced the policies of governments
preparing to accede to them. Thus, they involve current problems in many countries.
They will stand as a sharp reminder of world opinion to
all who may seek to violate the human rights they define. They
also serve as a continuous commitment to respect these rights.
There is no society so advanced that it no longer needs periodic
recommitment to human rights.
The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility
for support of the very fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all forms of tyranny....

Separate Additional Statement of Donald K. Duvall
Supplementary to the group statement to which I have subscribed
representing my position on the human rights conventions on abolition of slavery, abolition of forced labor, and political rights of women,
I wish to add some further observations concerning the advisability of
United States ratification of these conventions as a matter of policy.
The question arises, particularly as to the political rights of
women convention, whether international treaty-law is one of the
most effective and viable means for achieving the rights sought for
persons with differing traditions and cultural mores within the various
nation-states. Even granting the persuasive power and motivating
force of the world opinion and the legal sanctions to which treatyviolators might be subject, is this an effective way to develop a rule
of living law in the field of women's rights in each member state of
the world community? Put another way, in the long run, how genuine
International Lawyer, Vol.
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or even enforceable can an international treaty commitment be that
is based on some arbitrary rule of law from the top, unsustained by
reasonably related experience and evolution at the grass roots? These
questions assume, as Professor Northrop of Yale has suggested, that
the primary sanction of the positive law is the normative moral and
social content of the customs of a statistically large proportion of the
people affected.'
While the questions raised suggest a negative answer, who can
say with absolute certitude in this era of insistent nationalism and rising expectations, regional economic integration and markets, and
universal communications and transportation that such legal commitments at the international level have no part to play in building nations
of free men (and women) under law? The educational and enforcement problems for law thus imposed without adequate cultural and
institutional foundations could actually lead to increased disrespect
for law locally, nationally, and internationally. On the other hand,
new demands tend to bring new responses, and creative innovation
and dynamic change are hallmarks of the current transnational legal
and social development process. A treaty obligation that may add
little or nothing to the human rights already secure in a stable, democratically-governed, developed state conceivably could perform a
more vital standard-setting function in a forward-looking but less
stable and less democratic developing state whose governmental power
finds it more difficult to make any lasting substantial changes in the
status quo in the long-term national interest.
The point is, I think, that the provisions of the conventions now
before the Senate will be legally binding only upon those states which
ratify the conventions, a choice to be made by each state in the light
of its own development and mature judgment. In this connection, it
is interesting to note that the slavery convention, which, in certain
respects, goes further than the political rights of women convention in
affecting domestic social institutions and practices, has been ratified
by 69 states, including a number of developing states likely to be most
seriously affected. Thus, it seems to me, other countries should be
credited with no less prudence and sound judgment than the United
States in determining for themselves whether or not they should
ratify these conventions. Should our example in ratifying the conventions and participating in other forms of international cooperation
I See F. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics,
15 (1960).
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
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influence the behavior and strengthen the capabilities of other countries to assume the same obligations, then, to that extent, we would
have helped to strengthen the rule of law. To be true to its own revolutionary heritage of freedom under law and to its responsibility as a
world leader, the United States, I believe, can and should, consistent
with its constitutional principles, do no less.
Separate Additional Statement of Harry A. Inman
I agree generally with the constitutional considerations related
in the above statement. My personal position as to the three Conventions varies, however, from that given therein.
I am of the opinion that the Supplementary Slavery Convention
and the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor *
are a proper subject of international negotiation and are constitutional
under our laws and should, as a matter of policy, be ratified. These
two Conventions concern certain "uncivilized acts" which by their
very nature should be and are of international concern to the countries of the world no matter what citizenship. Certain enforceable
standards of human rights are a necessity in a modern and changing
world to assure reasonable regard for human dignity and fulfillment.
I believe, however, that each Convention should be judged on
its own merits. I am of the opinion that the rights under the Convention on the Political Rights of Women should not be dealt with in an
international treaty.
Statement of Lyman M. Tondel, Jr.
I do not have much knowledge in this field and my views are,
I fear, rather superficial. However, from what I do know I favor
ratification of the Supplementary Slavery Convention and of the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (subject to possible understandings for the purpose of clarification) on both constitutional and policy grounds, and I oppose ratification of the Convention
on the Political Rights of Women as unconstitutional.
What I say relates primarily to constitutional aspects. Is the
subject-matter in each case a "proper" subject "of negotiation between
With the understanding by the United States that the Convention does
not affect imprisonment for violation of injunctions lawfully issued in labor
disputes, conviction for participation in an illegal strike, use of conscripted labor
in periods of national emergency, or labor required by federal or state law for
punishment of lawfully convicted crime.
*
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our government and other nations"? Of course it depends on what
"proper" is taken to mean, but in this context I would take it to mean
that the subject-matter has substantial present bearing on international
affairs or relations. As developments make the nations more interrelated, more matters have such a bearing; but that is not to say that
all do.
Turning to the three treaties, I do not purport to know all the
practical ramifications of the language of the Conventions, but I do
believe that, as I read their language, the Supplementary Slavery and
Forced Labor Conventions do deal with subjects that are proper
subjects of international negotiation because of their international
ramifications. The effect on all the Americas of such practices within
the Dominican Republic under Trujillo is supporting evidence. The
efforts of relatives and friends abroad to release those enslaved or in
forced labor and to restore freedom to the country, embroiling other
states in the process, show that slavery and forced labor have substantial international consequences.
On the contrary, the Convention on Political Rights of Women,
at least in the context of today's world, does not seem to me to be a
proper treaty subject. The language of Geoffrey v. Riggs might have
barred our adherence to a treaty on this subject prior to the Nineteenth
Amendment. Did the passage of that Amendment in and of itself
enable us constitutionally to make treaties with other countries about
women's right to vote? Has there been evidence since 1920 that substantial international consequences result from a nation's refusal to
allow women (or, for that matter, men between 18 and 21, or any
other age) to vote or hold office? It may be argued that because other
nations in fact have entered into this Convention it is a proper subject
for negotiation; but what is a "proper" subject for some nations under
their basic laws may not be for all.
In summary, I agree that aspects of human rights may be the
proper subject of a treaty by this country. Each proposed treaty's
constitutionality depends, in part, on the international ramifications
of its own subject-matter. The mere fact that other countries have a
treaty on a certain subject seems to me only evidence of that subject's
international significance and not binding on a determination under
our Constitution. I also believe that the international significance of
various subject-matters changes with the facts and that the trend is
towards more and more internationalization; but, at any given time,
there is a line that must be drawn somewhere under our Constitution.
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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Joint Statement of Victor C. Folsom, G. W. Haight, David F.
Maxwell,* and George Ray
The main thrust of the argument against accession to the three
Human Rights Conventions now before the Senate for advice and
consent as to accession is that they deal primarily with matters of internal rather than international concern. Put another way, the argument is that the areas sought thereby to be brought within the scope
of international law and the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice are areas essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States and thus not approprate for international agreement.
Two counter arguments have been made. It is first said that
human rights are no longer exclusively of domestic concern, but are
now as a result of the U.N. Charter and the great growth of activity
in this area very much of international concern. The other argument
is that there is neither any limitation of this character on the treatymaking power of the United States nor any relevancy of such criterion
in considering whether or not as a matter of policy it is appropriate
to become a party.
The Report on this subject of the Standing Committee on Peace
and Law Through United Nations deals with the first part of the
second argument by referring to various judicial and other statements
on this subject since the beginning of the Republic. Reference might
also have been made to Section 117 of the American Law Institute
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, published in 1965. This is recent authority for the position that the treatymaking power of the United States under the federal Constitution is
limited to matters "of international concern." In the comment on
Section 117(1)(a), it is said
An international agreement of the United States must relate
to the external concerns of the nation as distinguished from
matters of a purely internal nature. As the effect of international
agreements is the creation or modification of relationships under
international law, it would be inconsistent to utilize them for
the regulation of matters bearing no relation to international
affairs. . ..
This limitation may also be expressed as excluding from the
scope of the treaty-making power matters which are "exclusively" or
"solely" within the area of "internal concern" and forming part of
See separate additional statement, infra, pp. 660-662.
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what in international law is regarded as "exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction" of a State. It would appear to have its counterpart in the U.N. Charter limitation in Article 2, paragraph 7.
It seems clear, therefore, that there is some limitation of this
character on the treaty power. In practice, it may not appear to be a
very substantial limitation. And what there is may be more of a
political than a legal nature. For, if the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, makes a treaty with one or more
other States, it would doubtless be difficult to establish that such a
treaty does not deal with a matter of international concern.
This is said to be particularly true in the case of the three Conventions now under consideration, as 68 States are parties to the
Slavery Convention, 77 to that on Forced Labor, and 51 to that on
the Political Rights of Women. Theoretically, however, the President
and two-thirds of the Senate could exceed the bounds of proprietythat is, they could so distort the limitation under discussion that reasonable men would say that they had attempted but failed to make
of international concern what is essentially domestic or internal.
In these borderline cases, therefore, the task is to examine the
essential nature of the subject matter and to see on which side of the
line it falls. This process may be regarded as political; that is, it consists of deciding what is appropriate in each particular case. It is
also, however, legal in the sense that it deals not only with a question
of jurisdictional competence, but with the making of both international
and domestic law. As the Report indicates, there may be situations
where treaties open the door to an even broader internationalization
of an area that would otherwise be regarded as domestic.
In fact, the first of the two counter arguments mentioned above,
namely, that human rights are no longer of exclusive domestic concern, is a recognition of just such a process, for it constitutes a bold
assertion that the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of States in this
area no longer exists. Thus, the representative of Uruguay in the last
General Assembly said
The question of respect for human rights could no longer
be regarded as a matter exclusively reserved for the domestic
jurisdiction of States and it became necessary to admit that
States, in freely agreeing to defend and protect those rights, did
not infringe their sovereignty but, on the contrary, in the very
exercise of that sovereignty established an international system
aimed at ensuring respect for human rights inherent in man and
existing before the State itself.
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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It is concern with this thesis that has prompted the close scrutiny
of the three Conventions now before the Senate. It has also prompted
a review of the whole subject of constitutional limitation and of the
counter argument that "international concern" is no longer a governing criterion.
The following notes and comments on the three Conventions
now before the Senate are submitted in the hope that they may assist
in the current appraisal of relevant constitutional and policy considerations.
Supplementary Convention on Slavery
Article 1 of this Convention relates to "debt bondage," "serfdom," and any institution or practice whereby a woman is promised
or given in marriage in payment of a consideration, or transferred
from her husband to another person for value received, or inherited
by another person on the death of her husband, or whereby a child
under 18 years is delivered to a person for the exploitation of his labor.
Article 2 deals with minimum ages of marriage and the registration
of marriages, Article 5 with the marking of persons of servile status,
and Article 6 with acts of enslaving.
The situations covered by Articles 1 and 2 appear essentially
domestic and of internal concern. Unlike acts of mutilating, branding or otherwise marking of slaves, and acts of enslaving, all of which
are covered by Section III and are obviously related to the traffic in
slaves, these domestic practices are in a class by themselves. They
arise not from the slave trade but from the primitive nature of many
societies, notably in Africa, where social development has frequently
not progressed beyond feudalism and tribalism. Such practices should
eventually be eradicated, and it may be appropriate to assist those in
the countries concerned who wish to bring this about. But are these
,practices matters of international concern to the United States?
There can, of course, be no question regarding the "international
concern" of the slave trade. The abolition of slavery itself was also
made a matter ofinternational concern when the United States adhered to the .Geneva Convention of September 25, 1926. The Supplementary Convention elaborates the undertakings in the earlier instrument to "prevent and suppress the slave trade" and to bring about
"the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms."
However, an attempt to put real teeth into the prohibition against
transporting slaves on the high seas of the Indian Ocean failed when
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the Supplementary Convention was put into final form at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in August and September 1956. A
committee on drafting had included a provision giving warships and
military aircraft a right of visit, search, and seizure in the area of
the Indian Ocean in relation to vessels of parties to the Convention
suspected on reasonable grounds of being engaged in the act of conveying slaves.
This sensible attempt to stop the slave trade in what appears to
be the principal area where it continues to operate encountered a
storm of criticism from Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, the Soviet bloc, and
to some extent India, Greece, and Portugal. The representative of
Sudan contended that it introduced political and military measures
which 'were the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council and
might be taken only to maintain or restore international peace or
security. In international law, vessels on the high seas continue to be
within the jurisdiction of their home States. Interference with them
"would therefore constitute intervention in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States."1 The Egyptian
delegate argued that, whatever traffic in slaves might still exist was
too small to justify the'granting of a right of military intervention.'
The Soviet representative said the provision conflicted with the accepted international law principles of freedom of navigation and of
criminal jurisdiction over crimes on the high seas in, the State of the
ship's nationality. There was very properly concern, he said, for safeguarding the principle of national sovereignty, respect for which was
"of paramount importance." 3
Strenuous efforts by the British and French representatives did
not succeed in preserving this provision. The latter argued that there
was no problem of national sovereignty, as States in the exercise of,
that sovereignty could waive its application to particular situations.'
The United Kingdom delegate urged that the provision would constitute "a practical contribution towards suppressing .the great evil
of slave-trading."
Despite these and other efforts to preserve some semblance of
teeth, the Conference ended with the adoption of the present vague
U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. Rec., E/CONF. 24/SR. 5, at 5 (16 Aug.

1956).
21bid., at 8.
3
4

Ibid., at 11.
Md., SR. 6 at 4 (16 Aug. 1956).

Ibid., at 7.
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provision that parties to the Convention "take all effective measures
to prevent ships and aircraft authorized to fly their flags from conveying slaves . . . ." Whether this Supplementary Convention will be
any more effective than the 1926 treaty in eradicating slavery and the
slave trade in the areas where they now exist is doubtful, particularly
as States on the Arabian peninsulas are not parties to it.
I.L.O. Convention on Forced Labor
The I.L.O. Convention on Forced Labor stems from an initiative
taken in 1947 by the American Federation of Labor with the U.N.
Economic and Social Council urging consideration of action to abolish
forced labor wherever it might be found.' Several years later, an
ad hoc committee was appointed to investigate the subject. Its comprehensive Report - concluded that systems of forced labor were employed in Eastern Europe as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views. It described in considerable detail the practices which it found to exist.
In view of this, it is not surprising that Article 1 of the Convention puts first the use of forced or compulsory labor as a means of
political coercion or education, and as a punishment for holding or
expressing political views. This is the main thrust of the Convention.
It was the intention of its proponents that it be "short, sharp and
effective." ' A text prepared by the Labour Office dealt only with what
are now clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 1. The provisions
relating to strikes and discrimination were added at the I.L.O. Conference in 1956. They and other additions were strenuously opposed
at the first Committee stage "because they purport to do precisely
what the Committee decided not to do (namely to widen the scope of
the instrument)." "
Stressing the urgency of dealing with systems of forced labor
"for political coercion and economic development," the United States
Government adviser said the objective was to prepare an instrument
"designed expressly to prohibit the particular forms of forced labour
,Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Human Rights Conventions, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (Feb. 23,
1967).
7 U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. Rec. 16th Sess., Doc. No. 13 (1953).
1 O'Brien, Employers' delegate, Ireland, on behalf of the Employers' group,
INT'L LAB. ORG. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 39 Congress, 31st Sitting,
at 508 (27 June 1956).
9 Ibid.
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covered and' condemned by the U.N.-I.L.O. Ad Hoc Committee,"
which, he went on to say, "have shocked and aroused the entire world."
The task of the Conference, he said, was to devise a Convention which
would "effectively abolish forced labour as it has been found to exist
as a means of political coercion and of inhuman exploitation on a large
scale." As a "valuable and effective aid" to this end, he urged that a
provision be added that would prohibit the transportation and acquisition of the products of forced labor.'" While the utility of this was
recognized by some, it was not adopted by the Committee."
When the Convention was discussed and voted on at the 40th
Congress of the I.L.O. in June 1957, the representative of the United
States Government said
The United States is prepared to vote for the Convention
because the United States strongly supports the objectives of
the Convention and because existing constitutional and legislative action in the United States already gives effect to the provisions of the Convention. In a legal sense, therefore, the United
States vote is merely expressive of conditions already existing
in the United States. From a moral standpoint we desire, by
our vote, to align ourselves with the extension throughout the
world of the abolition of forced labour in accordance with what
has long been the policy of the United States.
Under the United States constitutional system, the document, however, is not suitable or appropriate for a treaty...
The United States Employers' delegate was more emphatic:
Being a federal-state Government, we cannot ignore the
constitutional requirements of our country and the difficulties
confronting us in consideration of any international instrument
which deals with strictly domestic problems.
The employers of the United States support the principle
that it is inappropriate to embody in an international draft treaty
provisions governing the relationship of an individual to his own
government. We believe that international treaties are proper
only when they deal with the relationship of a national or his
government to foreign citizens or their governments.
I, too, support those views; and I should say to you that if
an instrument such as that before us should be submitted to our
10 Id., at 510, 511.
11 INT'L LAB. ORG. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 40th CONGRESS,
APP. VII, at 708 (1957). See also, Mr. Liang, Workers' delegate, China, 39th
Congress, 31st Sitting, at 504 (27 June 1957).
12INT'L LAB. ORG. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 40th CONGRESS,
22nd Sitting, at 352 (21 June 1957).
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Senate for ratification-the employers of the United States,
13
I among them, will unalterably oppose its ratification.
Disagreeing with the views last quoted above, the Workers'
adviser of the United States said:
With regard to the remark that Mr. Parker made in reference to the ratification of this instrument, unlike him I must say
that the workers of our country will support this instrument to
the fullest extent and I can assure the Conference that the workers of the United States will vigorously seek enforcement and
ratification of this instrument in its entirety.''
In the final vote, the Convention was adopted 240 to 0, with the
Employers' delegate from the United States alone abstaining. 5 However, in the Committee discussions on the Convention several close
votes were recorded. One of these related to the inclusion in Article 1
of clause (d) which incorporates in the Article's undertakings the
use of forced labor "as a punishment for having participated in
strikes." The Indian and Japanese Government members moved in
the Committee to delete this clause on the ground that its retention
might prevent their governments from ratifying the Convention. It
was said by the Indian member that under legislation in his country
imprisonment might be imposed as a penalty for participation in illegal
strikes and this might be construed as forced labor." Several other
Government members shared this view. A number said that the clause
would not cause them any practical difficulties, but they nevertheless
favored deletion of any clauses in the Convention not relevant to what
they regarded as the essential purposes of the Convention and which
"would prove a serious obstacle to ratification." The great majority
of Employers' members favored deletion.'"
On the other hand, the Workers' members, supported by a considerable number of Government members, strongly opposed deletion.
According to the Committee's Report, in their view:
Every country had legislation prescribing imprisonment with
hard labour for certain criminal offenses, and if that were
deemed to be forced labour then every government represented
at the Conference was guilty of imposing forced labour. The
workers agreed even that in certain circumstances penalties
1:; Id.,
14 Id..
15 Id.,
" Id.,

Mr. Parker, at 346, 347.
Mr. Cronin, at 353.
27th Sitting, at 444, 445.
Report of the Committee on Forced Labour, App. VII, at 709.

17 Ibid.
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could be imposed for participation in illegal strikes and that
these penalties might include normal prison labour . . . The

right to strike was a fundamental right of the workers in all
democratic countries ...

If the reference were now deleted this

could only be interpreted as meaning that the right to strike was
not recognised and that the Conference approved of the use of
forced labour as a penalty for participating in strikes . . .18
In reply to this last argument it was pointed out that the Convention "had nothing to do with the right to strike." That was guaranteed
by other instruments." Nevertheless, on a vote being taken, the
motion to delete this provision was defeated by 124 to 156, with 4
abstentions."0
At the full conference, the Indian Employers' adviser again explained the position of his government on this question, but said he
was glad to note the statement made by the Workers that "in certain
circumstances penalties could be imposed for participation in illegal
strikes and that these penalties might include normal prison labour."
In view of this clarification, he said India could "join all other progressive forces in supporting this historic Convention." 21 It has not,
however, yet been ratified by either India or Japan.
In urging the Senate in March of this year (1967) to approve
accession, Ambassador Goldberg argued that the Convention is not
intended, and should not be construed, to preclude the application of
penal sanctions for violations of court orders for participating in
illegal strikes or for other illegal activities.2"
By its terms, however, the Convention is not qualified in the
manner suggested. Although the views of the Workers' members at
the I.L.O Conference would undoubtedly carry great weight with a
tribunal called upon to construe Article 1(d), such a tribunal
(whether domestic or international) might consider itself compelled
to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used. Moreover, if
a declaration were made by the United States at the time of accession,
or if the position were reserved, in order to preclude such a construction, it is difficult to appreciate why other States could not make
similar declarations or reservations in respect of other provisions, so
Ibid.
19 Id., at 710.
20 Ibid.
18

21

INT'L LAB. ORG. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 40th CONGRESS,
22nd Sitting, at 345 (21 June 1957).
_2 Hearings, cit. supra note 1, at 36, 37.
23 Id., at 25, 26.
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as to avoid their application to other "illegal" activities, such as expressing political views in a manner prohibited by law.
Convention on the Political Rights of Women
Of the three Conventions now before the Senate, that dealing
with the political rights of women appears to be the farthest removed
from matters of genuine international concern. Doubtless the proponents of this instrument regard the political structure of a State as
having an impact on the internal affairs of other States. Greater
uniformity in the democratic pattern throughout the world would perhaps be desirable, but it is difficult to see how the internal political
structures of other states can be made a matter of international concern of the United States.
Here again, the test would appear to be whether the diminution
in domestic jurisdiction resulting from accession to this instrument
would be justified by the advantages to this country of promoting the
cause of universal suffrage throughout the world. If it should be, it
is difficult to see how other similar, but more far reaching, projects,
such as the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, could be resisted as encroaching too far
on domestic jurisdiction. The content of domestic jurisdiction would
be small indeed if all human rights matters were to be considered of
international concern and embodied in international instruments.
Conclusion
These three Conventions thus present the question whether international legislation may appropriately deal with matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State in a range of subject matter varying
from practices akin to slavery and the compulsive use of labor as a
punishment for political views to the right of a citizen to vote, to be
eligible for election to a public office, and to hold a public office. If,
as a matter of principle, the United States is prepared to accept such
a range of legislation with respect to its internal affairs, it is apparent
that a considerable invasion of the area of domestic jurisdiction will
result.
To an outside observer the legislative processes of international
organizations, including the U.N. General Assembly, are not always
apt to commend themselves as suitable substitutes for domestic procedures. In countries where a convention may not operate as internal
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law until it has been implemented by domestic legislation, this may
cause little concern. In the United States, however, this is not always
the case; in many instances a treaty, once ratified, becomes "the
supreme Law of the Land." So far as this country is concerned, therefore, it is appropriate to consider whether the benefits of having human rights law formulated by international organizations outweigh
the principle that a citizen is entitled to expect that the law governing
the domestic relations between himself and his own government is
formulated, debated, and enacted by representatives chosen by himself and his fellow citizens in accordance with the constitutional
processes of his own society.
This concern with the application of democratic methods to
domestic affairs may seem far-fetched in an age of explosive internationalism. It nevertheless appears essential to many, at least so far
as this country is concerned, that the legislative "process of drafting
legal norms in the field of human rights" (as Professor Gardner puts
it in his statement to the Senate Subcommittee) be entrusted to legislatures elected by the citizens of this country. Exceptions may in
certain instances be justified, but as a matter of principle it is difficult
to appreciate why an area of such vital importance to the citizen
should be referred to international bodies in which the United States
possesses less than one per cent of the voting power and which are
frequently dominated by the pressures of the new States of Africa and
Asia, whose social, political, and economic problems are radically
different from our own.
The fact that a convention is adopted by an international organization, with or without the participation of United States representatives, does not, of course, constitute internal law until it is ratified
after approval by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Nevertheless, once
an instrument has been adopted, particularly after several years of
study, debate, and compromise, the political pressures may be very
strong, as in the case of the three Conventions now under review, to
go along with other States which have ratified or to take the lead in
urging others to do so. What does concern many is that such pressures may result in a substantial body of human rights legislation,
formulated in the manner described, becoming the "law of the land."
Whether or not it supersedes legislation previously adopted by Congress, it would constitute a parallel or supplementary body of law
which could be invoked in domestic proceedings. Moreover, as such a
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
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body of international law became more comprehensive, the area of
domestic jurisdiction for the purposes of international law and international jurisdiction would be correspondingly reduced. International
practice might reduce it still further.
Because it is important in this sensitive area of human rights that
legislation be clear and unambiguous and represent the standards
desired by the community in which they operate, it may well be 'appropriate now to slow down this process of drafting legal instruments
in international bodies and' concentrate more on establishing procedures for investigations, reports, and recommendations.
Separate Additional Statement of David F. Maxwell
This memorandum is submitted in opposition to the adherence by
the United States Senate to the proposed Human Rights Conventions
emanating from the United Nations.
The Supplementary Slavery Convention, the Convention on the
Abolition of Forced Labor, and the Convention on Political Rights
of Women propose to grant privileges and immunities which have
long been. imbedded in the laws of the United States. To argue then
that there is no harm in adhering to these treaties is, to my mind,
a non sequitur. There is no need for us to engraft upon our Constitution a treaty which spells out the same individual rights our
citizens have already enjoyed for many years either under that basic
document or by statutory law. On the other hand, there are strong
reasons-why this should not be done.
All of the proposed conventions carry sanctions enforcible in
forums and by procedures fundamentally different from our own.
Our Constitution guarantees certain safeguards to our citizens charged
with crimes, such as the right to trial by jury, the right to a speedy
trial, the right to counsel, and the right to stand trial in the place
where the crime has been committed. Together these constitute the
so-called accusatory system which is the American way of administering criminal justice in contrast to the prosecutory method generally
practiced 'in Europe.
Under the Human Rights Conventions we would jeopardize
these precious keystones of our freedom and internationalize our
criminal procedures.
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It is clear that by unconditional adherence to these treaties,
the Connally reservation would no longer be effective to prevent the
World Court from assuming jurisdiction of a matter solely within
our domestic domain, thus establishing a precedent by which the
principle of the Connally reservation could be effectively bypassed
through the medium of separate international treaties. Such a precedent might readily give rebirth to the whole issue of the Bricker
Amendment to the Constitution. Furthermore, I am not impressed
by the fallacious argument that ratification of the Conventions would
be an example to the world. We in the United States have accorded
our citizens the rights proposed to be granted by the Conventions for
many years for all the world to see and follow, but apparently our
example has had little impact. If these laws have failed to encourage
a similar pattern of behavior in other nations through decades of
exposure, why is it logical to presume that reaffirming these principles through a treaty will make any deeper impression upon other
nations?
We are told that the year 1968 is to be designated as Human
Rights Year and that this is an occasion when America should manifest its good faith by subscribing to these proposed treaties. To my
mind this is a snare and a delusion. Every year is Human Rights
Year in the United States. In fact every new Supreme Court decision
brings with it new human rights for our citizens. Let the countries
practicing slavery and denying women their just deserts observe
Human Rights Year and let us not be trapped by this type of propaganda into relinquishing our most valuable heritage.
I submit that the Conventions under consideration by the United
States Senate must be judged by the effect ratification would have
upon our Constitution. Treaties made under the authority of the
United States are the supreme law of the land. In this respect we differ
from most other important countries where even after ratification of
a treaty, each country may decide when and to what extent it is
ready to implement a treaty by the passage of national legislation even
though the signatory state has agreed generally to enact such legislation. Consequently there is much merit in the position supported
by many authorities that upon the consent of the Senate to adhere
to the Human Rights Conventions, the Conventions would supersede every city ordinance, every country ordinance, every state law,
every state constitution, and every federal statute dealing with the
same subject throughout every state in the Union.
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This is a risk which I submit the Senate of the United States
should not permit our government to assume and I therefore urge
a vote against adherence to these treaties.
Statement of Harry Leroy Jones
I wish to make two points:
First: Accession to or ratification of those human rights conventions which deal exclusively with domestic matters would be
unconstitutional.
Second: Extending the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice into domestic areas where it is now forbidden by its statute to intrude (which is what would happen if the United States
becomes a party to these conventions) would foreclose repeal of the
Connally Reservation, and encourage revival of the Bricker Amendment, consequences which I think we should all deplore.
The three conventions sent to the Senate in 1963 all deal with
matters which concern the relation of the individual to his own government. If there is any principle of international law generally agreed
upon it is that this relationship is not governed by international law,
and is therefore within the unfettered discretion of each state. It is
indeed the most sensitive area of the reserved or domestic jurisdiction.
On its face, each of the two Conventions on Abolition of Forced
Labor and on the Political Rights of Women concerns only internal
matters. The Supplementary Slavery Convention contains a provision
on the slave trade, and to that extent superficially relates to external
relations. However, because this provision merely repeats a similar
provision of the 1926 Slavery Convention to which the United States
is a party, because the report of the U.N. Special Reporter on Slavery
discloses that in all countries that answered his questionnaire slavery
does not exist in fact or in law, and if it is true that no country which
is a party to this convention tolerates slavery, the provision relating
to the slave trade would be ineffective and insufficient to make the
matters dealt with of more than domestic concern.
I. Accession or Ratification Would Be Unconstitutional
To my knowledge these are the first treaties ever sent to the
Senate which concern only domestic matters. We should, therefore,
ask, would they be constitutional?
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
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Our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, told us in his
Manual of Parliamentary Practice that the treaty power comprehends
only those objects which are usually regulated by treaty, "and cannot
be otherwise regulated."
The Supreme Court has often discussed the scope of the treaty
power. The Court has never declared a treaty unconstitutional because it dealt only with domestic matters for the very good reason
that the treaty power has never before been used to regulate matters
which are exclusively domestic. But the language of several opinions,
beginning with that of Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v. Jennison'
in 1840 and through that of Chief Justice Hughes in Santovincenzo v.
Egan - in 1930, indicates that the treaty power can be used only to
regulate those matters which are of sufficient international concern
to be properly the subject of negotiation with another government.
A leading case is Geffroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 758, 33L.ed 642 (1890).
That a matter within the domestic jurisdiction is not a proper
matter for negotiation with another government is clear from statements made by Charles Evans Hughes when Secretary of State and
President of the American Society of International Law in 1928 '
and 1929.' In addresses before the Society he stated unequivocally
that the treaty power does not extend "to a subject which is exclusively
internal"- that "it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made
relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the
United States in their internal concerns ....
That the internal affairs of a foreign country are an improper
subject of diplomatic negotiation and therefore inappropriate for
regulation by treaty is equally clear. The relationship between Ruritania and its own citizens is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Ruritania. The relationship is not governed by international
law, and it would therefore be improper for the United States to
make diplomatic representations to Ruritania about it. By the same
token, a treaty governing matters which are exclusively domestic
in the party countries would be invalid under the law of the United
States. Whether it woud be valid internationally we need not inquire.
But the proponents of these conventions say that they would
be constitutional because they are of "international concern." Conventions which have been drafted by an organ of the United Nations,
1 14 Pet. 540, 10 Led. 538.
2 284 U.S. 40, 76 L.ed. 152, 155.
3 Proceedings, A.S.I.L. 1928, p. 61.
4Proceedings, A.S.I.L. 1927, p. 194.
International Lawyer, Vol.

1, No.

4

664/

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

approved by the General Assembly, and ratified by several states
must be of international concern, they assert. That seventy or eighty
states have ratified some of these treaties shows only that the subject
is of multi-national (but not "international") concern. No plenitude
of single domestic jurisdictions adds up to an international concern
sufficient to sustain the validity of these conventions under United
States law.
However, "international concern" alone is not a proper criterion
for assuring the constitutionality of a treaty. No language of the
Supreme Court and no standard authority support it.
I am fully aware that Section 117 of the 1965 official draft of
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law says that the United States
has power under the Constitution to make an international agreement
if "(a) the matter is of international concern, and (b) the agreement
does not contravene any of the limitations of the Constitution." Its
predecessor, Section 120 of the Proposed Final Draft, fully reflected
the language of the Supreme Court and of the standard authorities
in reading "if the matter is of sufficient international concern to be
properly the subject of international negotiation." Section 120 came
before the American Law Institute late Saturday afternoon on May 5,
1962,1 when there were only 24 members on the floor. The late Judge
Philip Halpern, a former advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, made an extended plea to
broaden the language because it would not be clear that the human
rights conventions would be constitutional. By a vote of 14 to 10
(out of a total membership of 1800) the language was changed to
"if the matter is of international concern." Upon noticing the paucity
of attendance, the vote was promptly rescinded, and the President
announced that there was "no vote." The Proposed Final Draft was
then approved for publication, and the Reporter was authorized to
make "editorial revision in matters not affecting the substance." The
language of Section 120 of the Proposed Final Draft was thereafter
never reconsidered by either the Council or the Institute, and the
words, "international concern" appears in Section 117 of the official
draft apparently upon the editorial authority of the distinguished
Reporter alone.
Moreover, the concept of "international 'concern" is inappropriate and unsatisfactory as a criterion of constitutional validity.
What kind of concern, how much concern, and to whom? "InterProceedings, A.L.I. 1962, p. 495-517.
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national concern" has no legal standards. "International concern"
is too susceptible of manipulation by small but -well-financed pressure
groups, to serve as a. norm of constitutional validity.
II. Ratification or Accession Would Render Improbable the Repeal of
the Connally Reservation and Probable the Revival of the Bricker
Amendment.
The International Court of Justice does not now have jurisdiction of matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of
a party, not only because Article 2(7), of the Charter of the U.N.
forbids intrusion into the internal affairs of a state, but because
Article 36 of the Court's statute gives it jurisdiction only over questions of international law.
A domestic matter is transposed into, a matter governed by
international law by being incorporated into a treaty, so said the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Tunis and Morocco
nationality decrees case.'
The human rights conventions dealing, as they do, with the
political and economic status of citizens, racial discrimination against
citizens, the social and cultural rights of citizens, the conditions of
labor and education of citizens, and the civil and political rights of
citizens, all in great detail, cover a substantial portion of the domestic
corpus juris.
Ratification of the conventions would go far to destroy the
domestic jurisdiction into which the International Court of Justice
may not now intrude. The Court could thereafter consider questions
which we have heretofore refused to submit to its jurisdiction because
they are domestic questions which we have by the Connally Amendment reserved to ourselves the right to determine whether they are
domestic.
This Section has always favored the repeal of the Connally
Reservation, and it has opposed the intrusion of the International
Court of Justice into matters of domestic jurisdiction. In the Report
of the Section Committee on the Connally Reservation in 1959 we
said, "Our problem has nothing to do with whether domestic disputes shall be within the Court's jurisdiction. Clearly they are not
intended to be; and they should not be." In another place we referred
o P.C.I.J.

Sec. B, No. 4 (1923).
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to a possible decision against the United States on a domestic matter
as "an errant incursion into domestic affairs." '
One of the principal arguments advanced in favor of repeal of
Connally was that it was unnecessary because the Court's statute
itself prevented its assuming jurisdiction over domestic matters.
When the House of Delegates considered the resolution favoring
repeal of Connally in 1960, repeal won by a small majority of seven
votes.8 If the United States becomes a party to these human rights
conventions, the only impediment to the Court's "incursion" into
domestic disputes would be the Connally Reservation, and it might
be difficult to invoke it in good faith. I venture to prophesy that
the opponents of repeal of Connally would gather such strength
that they would win the next vote in the House of Delegates.
May I conclude by saying that I believe that the greatest contribution which the United States can make toward the rule of law
is to repeal the Connally Reservation, and that Article VI with its
supremacy clause is one of the jewels of the Constitution. If the cost
of ratifying the human rights conventions is to endanger repeal of
Connally and to resuscitate Bricker, the cost is far too great.
7 Section Committee report on the self-judging aspect of the United States's
domestic jurisdiction reserved with respect to the I.C.J., Aug. 1959, p. 53.
8 85 Rep. A.B.A., p. 328.
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